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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
Among the decisions set before our readers this month is one embodying
a decision of the United States supreme court (Fox vs. Edwards, collector)
in which it is ruled that recovery of an overpayment of tax voluntarily
made cannot be had without "establishing payment under protest in a suit
against the collector.”
The history of the case is not fully stated, but it seems apparent that
the taxpayer made a return and paid the tax called for by said return
and subsequently discovered that he had failed to deduct a bad debt in
computing his taxable income. He then, under provisions of section 252
of the revenue act of 1918, made a claim against the collector for the
amount of the overpayment and upon its being denied entered suit for
its recovery. In view of the language quoted above from Judge Knox’s
decision it may be that the claim was not properly made. It is difficult
to see under any other assumption why such overpayment erroneously
made is not recoverable under section 252 of the revenue act of 1918.
However, it may be safely assumed that this overpayment was denied for
some good and sufficient reason. In view of the fact that a taxpayer’s
return is subject to revision and correction of the assessment for a
number of years after it has been made, the justice of Judge Knox’s
conclusion that a taxpayer has not the right “to harass and annoy the
taxing officials and the courts as to the unwisdom, unpropriety or over
sight of what he himself did” is not apparent.
Another supreme court decision reaffirming a former one as to estate
taxes is contained in treasury decision No. 3319. As the subject matter
of this decision has appeared in this department heretofore, we make no
comment upon it, but recommend it for a careful reading.

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. No. 3305—March 16, 1922)
Returns made for fiscal year ending in 1921—Time within which new returns
under revenue act of 1921 to be filed.
If any taxpayer has before November 23, 1921, filed a return for a fiscal
year ending in 1921, and paid or become liable for a tax computed under
the revenue act of 1918, and is subject to additional tax for the same period
under the revenue act of 1921, the return covering such additional tax shall
be filed at the same time as the returns of persons making returns for the
fiscal year ending February 28, 1922, are due under the law and regulations,
and payment of such additional tax is due in the same instalments and at
the same times as in the case of payments based on returns for the fiscal
year ending February 28, 1922. If no part of the tax for the taxpayer’s
fiscal year was due until after November 22, 1921, the whole amount of
tax due, including the tax due under the original return and the additional
tax due under the new return, will be payable in the same instalments and
at the same times as in the case of payments based on returns for the fiscal
year ending February 28, 1922. Attention is directed to the provisions of
sections 214 (a) (9) and 234 (a) (8) of the revenue act of 1921.
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(T. D. 3308—March 20, 1922)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Voluntary Payment—Protest—Recovery as Against Collector.
Where a taxpayer voluntarily files a return and pays the tax due there
under without protest or complaint, but later determines that he has over
paid his tax, due to failure to take deductions to which he believes he was
entitled, there can be no recovery against the collector to whom the taxes
were paid at common law or under the statute relating to him or his office.

2. Same—Section 252, Revenue Act of 1918.
Any rights which may be granted by section 252 of the revenue act of
1918 can not be asserted in a suit against a collector for the recovery of
taxes voluntarily paid; nor does that section relieve a taxpayer from the
obligation of establishing payment under protest in a suit against a collector.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York in the case of Benjamin Fox v. William H.
Edwards, collector, is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Benjamin Fox, plaintiff, v. William H. Edwards, defendant.
MEMORANDUM INDORSED UPON NOTICE OF MOTION FILED NOVEMBER 2, 1921.
[Dec. 12, 1921.]
Knox, judge: When the within motion came on for argument, there
was a default upon behalf of this plaintiff, and no brief has been filed by or
for him. I am, therefore, deprived of the benefit of such views as he or his
counsel may entertain with respect to the facts and law here involved. It
appears from the complaint, to which defendant demurred, that the money
for the recovery of which suit was brought was paid voluntarily in March,
1919, as and for a part of plaintiff’s income tax for the year 1918. The item
of loss, upon account of which plaintiff now believes himself entitled to a
refund, was not called to the attention of any government official prior to
March, 1921. The original tax having been transmitted to the Treasury
without protest or complaint upon the part of plaintiff, it seems to me that
as against the collector there could be no recovery at common law nor
under the statutes relating to him or his office.
It is possible that plaintiff has some rights granted to him under the
provisions of section 252 of the revenue act of 1918; but, if so, I am of
opinion that such right can not be asserted in a suit against the collector
who received plaintiff’s voluntary payment in 1918. Judgment may be
entered sustaining the demurrer of defendant and dismissing the complaint.
ON REHEARING.

[Feb. 24, 1922.]
Knox, judge: It is my judgment that there is nothing in section 252 of
the revenue act upon which plaintiff relies which relieves him from the
effect of having voluntarily paid an amount of tax against which he might
have offset a bad debt. The tax was paid by plaintiff with full knowledge
of all the facts, and without any interposition of the government or any of
its officials, and to hold that a taxpayer is entitled for years after the pay
ment of a tax to harass and annoy the taxing officials and the courts as to
the unwisdom, unpropriety, or oversight of what he himself did, when
under no coercion and compulsion upon the part of the government, is
something I am unwilling to do. As to the purpose and effect of section
252 of the revenue act, see Holmes Federal Taxes, 1922 edition, page 890.
The order heretofore mentioned herein will stand.
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(T. D. 3316—April 5, 1922)
Income tax—Federal estate and state inheritance taxes.
Article 134, Regulations No. 45, amended.
Article 134 of regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Art. 134. Federal estate and state inheritance taxes.—Federal estate
taxes, paid or accrued during the taxable year, are an allowable deduction
from the gross income of the estate in computing the net income thereof
subject to tax. Such taxes are deemed to have accrued on the due date
thereof, namely, one year after the decedent’s death, except in any case
where the commissioner has granted an extension or extensions of time for
payment, such taxes are then deemed to have accrued on the due date or
dates of such extension or extensions.
Estate, succession, • legacy, or inheritance taxes, imposed by any state,
territory or possession of the United States, or foreign country, are deduct
ible by the estate, subject to the provisions of section 214, where, by the
laws of the jurisdiction exacting them, they are imposed upon the right or
privilege to transmit rather than upon the right or privilege of the heir,
devisee, legatee, or distributee, to receive or to succeed to the property of
the decedent passing to him. Where such taxes are imposed upon the right
or privilege of the heir, devisee, legatee, or distributee, so to receive or to
succeed to the property, they constitute, subject to the provisions of section
214, an allowable deduction from his gross income.
Where, in accordance with a direction contained in the testator’s will, the
taxes upon the right to receive any particular devise or devises, legacy or
legacies, are so payable as to relieve the particular devisee or devisees,
legatee or legatees, from the burden thereof, then the person or persons
entitled to the fund or other property out of which payment is made may
not take deduction of the taxes so paid, but deduction thereof is available
only by such devisee or devisees, legatee or legatees; each, if there be
more than one, being authorized to deduct such part of the taxes so paid as
he would otherwise have been entitled to do had there been no such testa
mentary direction.
Where there is a life estate and a remainder, and, by the laws of the
jurisdiction imposing them, the taxes in respect to both interests are payable
out of the remainder interest, with no legal obligation imposed whereby
the remainderman is entitled to reimbursement, then deduction of the
taxes so paid may be taken only by the remainderman. Where, in the case
of an annuity, the taxes in respect thereto are, by the laws of the juris
diction imposing them, payable in the first instance out of the fund set
aside for creating the annuity, but are to be repaid or restored to such
fund from the annuity, then deduction thereof may be taken only by the
annuitant.
The accrual dates of such taxes shall be the due date thereof except as
otherwise provided by the law of the jurisdiction imposing them. Where
deduction is claimed of any such taxes, the amount thereof and the name
of the state, territory, or possession of the United States, or foreign
country, by which they have been imposed shall be stated in the return.
(T. D. 3318—April 5, 1922)
Insurance tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
1. Life Insurance—Section 504—Nature of Association.
Plaintiff association, comprised of members brought together without
regard to locality of place for the sole purpose of insuring the lives of
such members, under a business plan which divided the members into
“circles” of 1,000 members each, charged a small entrance fee and paid
losses by graduated, limited assessments, collected at time of losses upon
the surviving members of that particular “circle.” The assessments also
provided for the maintenance of the business organization and operation,
but no reserve, surplus, or other fund was provided, and no dividends or
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profits could be earned. The amount of insurance of each member was at
entrance $100, which amount increased after the first six months at the
rate of $12.50 per month to a maximum of $1,000, provided that all dues
and assessments were promptly paid, and provided that the value of any
certificate should not exceed the net proceeds of a regular assessment of
the surviving members of that “circle.” Held, that the association was
not merely a mutual aid society but was a life insurance company, within
the meaning of section 504 of the revenue act of 1917, imposing a tax on
each $100 or fractional part thereof of the amount for which any life is
insured under any policy of insurance or other instrument, by whatever
name the same is called, said section not requiring profits or dividends as
a prerequisite to the tax.
2. Life Insurance—Exemption—Section 504 (d).
Said association is not exempt under subdivision (d) of section 504 of
the revenue act of 1917, which exempts policies issued by associations whose
income is exempt from taxation under title I of the revenue act of 1916,
the association not coming within the meaning of either the third, sixth,
or tenth paragraphs of section 11 (a) of said latter act, which, respectively,
limit the exemption to fraternal beneficiary societies operating under the
lodge system, to nonprofit organizations which are organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, and
to farmers’ or other mutual hail, cyclone, or fire insurance company, mutual
ditch or irrigation company, mutual or cooperative telephone company, or
like organization, of a purely local character, the income of which consists
solely of assessments, dues, and fees collected from members for the sole
purpose of meeting its expenses.
3. Same—Revenue Act of 1916, Section 11 (a), Subdivision “Tenth”—
“Like Organization."
A life insurance company is not a “like organization” to those enumer
ated in subdivision “tenth” of section 11 (a), revenue act of 1916, such
organizations being “farmers’ or other mutual hail, cyclone, or fire insur
ance company, mutual ditch or irrigation company, mutual or cooperative
telephone company.”
4. Same—Assessment and Collection of Tax—Basis.
Assessment and collection of the tax not alone on the initial certificate
value of $100, but also upon the accrued increased valuation basis of $12.50
monthly after the first six months, was proper, such total sum representing
the “amount of insurance” intended by section 504 (a) of the revenue act
of 1917.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the eighth circuit in the case of Bankers and Planters Mutual Insurance
Association v. Jack Walker, collector, rendered January 10, 1922, affirming
the judgment of the district court of the United States for the eastern
district of Arkansas, is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. No. 5616.
December Term, 1921.
Bankers and Planters Mutual Insurance Association, plaintiff in error, v.
Jack Walker, as collector of internal revenue for the district of Ar
kansas, defendant in error.
[January 10, 1922.]
Error to district court of the United States for the eastern district of
Arkansas.
Before Hook and Stone, circuit judges, and Cotteral, district judge.
Stone, circuit judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
The petition herein was for recovery of internal-revenue taxes, paid
under protest, which had been assessed and collected under section 504 of
the war revenue tax law of 1917 (40 Stat. 315). This section provided for
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tax on life insurance business. The tax rate was 8 cents on “each $100
or fractional part thereof of the amount for which any life is insured under
any policy of insurance, or other instrument, by whatever name the same
is called.” This petition was amended in respects not here important. The
court sustained a demurrer thereto. Plaintiff elected to stand upon the
amended petition and declined to further plead. From a judgment entered
in favor of defendant plaintiff brings this writ of error.
Plaintiff was an association of members brought together without regard
to locality or place, and for the sole purpose of insuring the lives of the
members. The business plan was to divide the members into “circles” of
1,000 members each, charge a small entrance fee, and pay losses by gradual,
limited assessments, collected at time of loss, upon the surviving members
of that particular “circle.” The assessments also provided for the mainte
nance of the business organization and operation, but no reserve surplus,
or other fund was provided, and no dividends or profits could be earned.
The amount of insurance of each member was at entrance $100, which
amount increased after the first six months at the rate of $12.50 per month
to a maximum of $1,000, provided that all dues and assessments were
promptly paid, and provided that the value of any certificate should not
exceed the net proceeds of a regular assessment of the surviving members
of that “circle.”
The tax was assessed and collected, against protest, not alone on the
initial certificate value of $100, but also upon the accrued increased valua
tion basis of $12.50 monthly after the first six months.
Plaintiff in error claims here that it was not subject to any tax under
section 504, supra, and also that, if so subject, the basis of tax could not
attach to the accrued increases, but only to the initial certificate value
of $100.
The theories upon which plaintiff relies to entirely escape the tax are,
first, that it is not within the meaning of section 504; and, second, that it
is within each of two expressed exemptions from that section. The argu
ment as to the first contention is that plaintiff is not an insurance company,
but merely “a mutual aid society, organized for the mutual benefit of its
members upon the pro rata assessment plan, has no capital stock, and makes
absolutely no profit for the members thereof.” This contention is unsound,
because this is a purely life insurance arrangement and business, and section
504 does not require profits or dividends as a prerequisite to this tax.
The contentions as to exemptions are based upon subdivision (d) of
section 504 and upon section 700 of the same act (40 Stat. 318). Sub
division (d) of section 504 provides that “policies issued by any person,
corporation, partnership, or association, whose income is exempt from
taxation under title I of the act entitled ‘an act to increase the revenue,
and for other purposes,’ approved September 8, 1916, shall be exempt from
the taxes imposed by this section.” The portions of title I of the revenue
act of 1916 thought applicable by plaintiff in error are the first paragraph
of section 10 (39 Stat. 765) and portions of section 11 (a) (39 Stat. 766).
The part of section 10 is as follows:
That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon
the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources
by every corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance
company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or
organized, but not including partnerships, a tax of two per centum upon
such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid
annually upon the total net income received in the preceding calendar year
from all sources within the United States by every corporation, joint-stock
company or association, or insurance company organized, authorized, or
existing under the laws of any foreign country, including interest on bonds,
notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or other
wise, and including the income derived from dividends on capital stock or
from net earnings of resident corporations, joint-stock companies or asso
ciations, or insurance companies whose net income is taxable under this
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title: Provided, That the term “dividends” as used in this title shall be
held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corpo
ration, joint-stock company, association, or insurance company, out of its
earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen,
and payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corpo
ration, joint-stock company, association, or insurance company, which stock
dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value.
The portions of section 11 (a) are as follows:
That there shall not be taxed under this title any income received by
any . . . Third. Fraternal beneficiary society, order, or association,
operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the mem
bers of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system, and providing
for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of
such society, order, or association or their dependents; . . . Sixth. Corpo
ration or association organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the net income
of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual;
. . . Tenth. Farmers’ or other mutual hail, cyclone, or fire insurance com
pany, mutual ditch or irrigation company, mutual or cooperative telephone
company, or like organization of a purely local character, the income of
which consists solely of assessments, dues, and fees collected from members
for the sole purpose of meeting its expenses.
The contentions are that plaintiff in error should be included in fra
ternal benefit societies, in associations not organized for profit, and cer
tainly in the last above-quoted exemption of “like organization of a purely
local character, the income of which consists solely of assessments, dues,
and fees collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting its
expenses.”
Clearly the plaintiff in error does not come within the above class of
fraternal benefit societies because the statute exempts only such as are
“operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the mem
bers of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system,” and plaintiff
admittedly is not so operating.
It is equally clear that plaintiff can not escape such tax under sub
division “Sixth” of section 11 (a) above quoted. That subdivision does
not exempt all nonprofit organizations (even if plaintiff be of that class),
but it exempts only such nonprofit organizations as are “organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes,” and obviously plaintiff falls completely without all of these
four classes.
It is also evident that plaintiff does not come within the “like organi
zation of a purely local character, the income of which consists solely of
assessments, dues, and fees collected from members for the sole purpose
of meeting its expenses” as set out in subdivision “Tenth” of section 11 (a),
above quoted. This is not a “purely local” organization; its income is not
collected for the mere purpose of “meeting its expenses" but goes much
beyond this and covers insurance payments; and it is not a “like organiza
tion,” such organizations being “Farmers’ or other mutual hail, cyclone,
or fire insurance company, mutual ditch or irrigation company, mutual or
cooperative telephone company.” Life insurance is too well known and
important for us to suppose that congress would detail hail, cyclone, and
fire insurance and intend life insurance to be included in the general
expression of “like association.” The plaintiff is clearly liable to the tax.
The final contention is that the tax was assessed upon a wrong basis.
This plan of insurance divided the members into so-called “circles” of
approximately 1,000 members. Upon entrance, a member was issued a
benefit certificate which provided for payment, upon death, of $100, with
accumulations, if any. These accumulations began after a membership
for six months and continued, at the rate of $12.50 a month, until the total
value of the certificate reached $1,000. The payment of any benefits
depended upon dues being kept up to the time of death. The payment was
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through assessments upon the other members of the particular “circle.”
These assessments were governed in amount, by age and length of mem
bership, with a maximum of $1.12 for each death. The benefit paid might
therefore be affected by the amount of the assessment which could be
collected from that “circle.” The membership of each “circle” is main
tained at approximately 1,000 by the admission of new members.
The collector assessed the tax on the basis of $100 and the accrued
accumulations, after six months, of $12.50 a month. Plaintiff contends
that such accumulations should not have been included. This is based on
the contentions that the statute limits the amount to the value at the time
of issuance of the policy and that the value of the accumulations is uncertain
because dependent upon the policy being kept up until death and upon the
amount which can be collected from assessment on the other members of
the “circle.”
The provisions of the statute relied upon to support the first contention
are found in section 504 of the act of 1917 (40 Stat. 315), and are as
follows: “There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid the following
taxes on the issuance of insurance policies: (a) Life insurance: A tax
equivalent to 8 cents on each $100 or fractional part thereof of the amount
for which any life is insured under any policy of insurance, or other
instrument, by whatever name the same is called.” This quoted passage
defines the subject of taxation to be “the issuance of insurance policies.”
It then sets out the rate of taxation on the issuance of life-insurance poli
cies to be 8 cents “on each $100 or fractional part thereof of the amount
for which any life is insured under any policy of insurance,” etc. The
policies, or instruments, of insurance issued by plaintiff called for $100 and
accumulations. Every condition of the contract which might affect the
payment of the accumulations might equally affect the minimum of $100.
Therefore, the amount of insurance called for by the contract can not, in
any sense, be said to be $100 rather than that sum plus accumulations
which might have been earned by the member. Such accumulations do
not, therefore, fall without the intent of the statute.
Nor can it matter that, under the contract, the payment of accumulations
or the amount of such payment is conditioned upon payment of dues by the
insured and upon the amount collectible from surviving members of the
“circle.” The same conditions apply to payment of the $100 minimum.
Generally speaking, similar situations are of frequent occurrence in insur
ance matters. The assessment was properly levied against the $100 mini
mum and the accumulations earned at the time of the assessment because
that total sum represented at that time, under this form of insurance
contract, the “amount of insurance” intended by the statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
Judge Hook concurred in the above disposition of this case, but died
before preparation of the opinion.
(T. D. 3319—April 5, 1922)
Estate tax—Act of September 8 1916—Decision of Supreme Court.
1. Constitutionality of Act.
Title II, act of September 8, 1916, imposing an estate tax, is constitu
tional. Decision of the United States supreme court in New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner (41 Sup. Ct. 506) held controlling.
2. Deduction—State Transfer Tax Not Deductible as a Charge
Against the Estate.
The New York state transfer tax is not a charge that affects “the
estate as a whole.” It diminishes each legacy bequeathed by decedent, and
is therefore not “a charge against the estate” and may not be deducted from
the gross estate under the provisions of section 203 of the revenue act of
1916. Decision of the United States supreme court in New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner (41 Sup. Ct. 506) held controlling.
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3. Gross Estate—Dower—Bequest or Devise in Lieu of.
If a widow accepts a provision made in lieu of dower, the value of the
property thus bequeathed or devised must be included in the gross estate,
as defined in section 203 of the revenue act of 1916, and the amount so
included may not be diminished by deducting the value of the widow’s
dower in decedent’s realty.
The appended decision of the United States district court for the south
ern district of New York in the case of Title Guarantee & Trust Co. and
Minnie W. Teets, as executors of the last will and testament of Joseph
W. Teets, deceased, v. Edwards, collector, is published for the information
of revenue officers and others concerned.

United States District Court, Southern District of New York. No. 741.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co. and Minnie W. Teets, as executors of the
last will and testament of Joseph W. Teets, deceased, plaintiffs, v.
William H. Edwards, collector of internal revenue of the United
States for the second district, defendant.
[February 14, 1922.]
Francis G. McLaughlin, attorney for plaintiffs; James F. Brady, counsel,
William Hayward, United States attorney, for defendant; Richard S.
Holmes and H. M. Darling, counsel.
Hand, district judge: This is an action brought by the executors of
Joseph W. Teets to recover a federal estate tax assessed against the estate
of the decedent and collected by the defendant, the collector of internal
revenue. Each side has moved for the direction of a verdict; the plain
tiffs (1) for the full amount of the tax on the ground that the estate tax
law is unconstitutional; (2) for the amount of the federal estate tax
computed upon the state inheritance taxes paid by the executors, which
plaintiffs contend should have been deducted in computing the value of
the estate for the purpose of measuring the federal tax; (3) for the
amount of tax collected upon the value of the widow’s dower in decedent’s
realty, which was included by the commissioner in the value of the gross
estate. The provisions in the will for the benefit of the widow are in
terms made “in lieu and bar of dower and thirds in my estate.”
The recent decision of the supreme court in New York Trust Co. et al.,
as executors, v. Mark Eisner, decided May 16, 1921, expressly held that
the federal estate tax act was constitutional and that by it a deduction of
the New York transfer tax should not be allowed in computing the estate
taxable under the federal act. Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to distinguish
this case on the ground that Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion of the
court, proceeded upon an erroneous theory in holding that the New York
transfer tax was not a charge affecting “the whole estate.”
Section 203 of the federal estate tax law defines as the taxable net
estate the gross estate less various deductions and “such other charges
against the estate as were allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether
within or without the United States, under which the estate is being
administered. ...”
The supreme court affirmed the decision of Judge Mack, who said in
his opinion:
Estate taxes or probate duties levied by the state would fall within
this clause (Northern Trust Co. v. Lederer, 257 Fed. 812) ; but taxes
levied on the shares to be received by beneficiaries, reducing not the estate
but the individual’s share can not be deemed a charge upon the estate
merely because the duty with the corresponding liability and right to
account in respect thereto in his estate accounts is imposed upon the
executor or administrator to pay the tax before distributing the share
itself. The nature of the tax as a succession not an estate tax remains
unchanged, despite the additional obligation thus imposed. . . .
Neither Judge Mack nor, I believe, Justice Holmes necessarily intended
to hold that the tax was a tax upon the privilege of the legatee to receive
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his legacy. Mr. Justice Holmes and Judge Mack, as well as the circuit
court of appeals in the case of Prentiss v. Eisner (267 Fed. 16), spoke of
the New York transfer tax as a succession tax, but the circuit court of
appeals in Prentiss v. Eisner especially defined this tax as upon the
privilege of decedent to dispose of his property to legatees mentioned in
his will respectively. In the court below I had refused to allow the tax
as a deduction from the legatee’s income taxes but without passing upon
its precise nature. These various cases can be reconciled only upon the
theory that the New York transfer taxes are not a charge upon the estate
as a whole, but upon the particular gifts by the testator. These imposts
are at different rates, depending on the relation of the beneficiary to the
testator, and in some cases, where religious or charitable gifts are involved,
no tax is exacted. But whatever be the nature or the incidence of the
tax, the supreme court in the case of New York Trust Co. et al., as
executor, v. Eisner, supra, has expressly passed upon the question whether
it can be deducted in computing the taxable estate and has held adversely
to plaintiff’s contention, and I am bound to follow this decision.
As to the question whether the value of the widow’s dower in decedent’s
realty should be deducted in computing the taxable estate, I am quite
clear that the plaintiffs have made no case. The decisions of the New
York courts as to the effect of the New York transfer tax act are uniform
and hold that a devise or bequest in lieu of dower can not be diminished
for purposes of taxation by the value of the widow’s dower right. (Matter
of Riemann, 42 Misc. 648; Matter of Barbey, 114 N. Y. Sup. 725; Matter
of Stuyvesant, 72 Misc. 295; and Matter of Church, 80 Mise, 447.)
I think the argument of counsel for the defendant is sound that if the
New York transfer tax act, which lays the tax on the value of the property
passing to the beneficiary, does not allow a deduction of her dower right,
such deduction can not be properly made under the federal estate tax act
where taxation is based upon the estate which the decedent parts with. A
legacy in lieu of dower after election resembles a residuary gift which
becomes operative or is suggested by the refusal of a specific legatee to
take. In the latter case, as was held in Matter of Wolfe (89 A. D. 349,
affirmed 179 N. Y. 599), the tax is upon the amount received by the
residuary legatee after the refusal of the specific legatee to take.
For the foregoing reasons a verdict should be directed for the defendant.

Charles Byers
Charles Byers, certified public accountant of Texas, member of
the American Institute of Accountants, died at Dallas, April 18, 1922,
after a comparatively short illness. Mr. Byers was born in London in
1865. He had practised accountancy in Australia, and had been in
practice in this country for about twenty years. He was active in
affairs of the Texas State Society of Certified Public Accountants
and was highly esteemed in his profession.

William T. McDowell
William T. McDowell, C. P. A. (Pa.), member of the American
Institute of Accountants, died April 19, 1922, after an illness lasting
several months.
Mr. McDowell was well-known among the
accountants in Philadelphia and greatly respected.
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